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Abstract
This paper explores the scenarios under which an attacker can claim that ‘Noise
and access to the softmax layer of the model is all you need’ to steal the weights of
a convolutional neural network whose architecture is already known. We were able
to achieve 96% test accuracy using the stolen MNIST model and 82% accuracy
using the stolen KMNIST model learned using only i.i.d. Bernoulli noise inputs.
We posit that this theft-susceptibility of the weights is indicative of the complexity
of the dataset and propose a new metric that captures the same. The goal of
this dissemination is to not just showcase how far knowing the architecture can
take you in terms of model stealing, but to also draw attention to this rather
idiosyncratic weight learnability aspects of CNNs spurred by i.i.d. noise input.
We also disseminate some initial results obtained with using the Ising probability
distribution in lieu of the i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the fate of an attacker who is adamant about only using noise as input to a
convolutional neural network (CNN) whose architecture is known and whose weights are the target
of theft. We assume that the attacker has earned access to the softmax layer and is not restricted in
terms of the number of inputs to be used to carry out the attack.
At the outset, we’d like to emphasize that our goal in disseminating these results is not to convince
the reader on the real-world validity of the attacker-scenario described above or to showcase a novel
attack. This paper contains our initial explorations after a chance discovery that we could functionally
replicate the weights of an MNIST-trained CNN model by just using noise as input into the framework
described below.
Through a set of empirical experiments, which we are duly open sourcing to aid reproducibility, we
seek to draw the attention of the community on the following two issues:
1. This risk of model weight theft clearly entails an interplay between the dataset as well as
the architecture. Given a fixed architecture, can we use the level of susceptibility as a novel
metric of complexity of the dataset?
2. Given the wide variations in success attained by varying the noise distribution, how do we
formally characterize the relationship between the input noise distribution being used by the
attacker and the true distribution of the data, while considering a specific CNN architecture?
What aspects of the true data distribution are actually important for model extraction?
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
In Section 2, we provide a brief literature survey of the related work. In Section 3, we describe
the methodology used to carry out the attack. In Section 4, we cover the main results obtained and
conclude the paper in Section 5.
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Table 1: Victim architecture as found in the MNIST example in the documentation for the Keras deep
learning library.
LAYER TYPE DIMENSIONS ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION
CONVOLUTIONAL 32, 3× 3 RELU
CONVOLUTIONAL 64, 3× 3 RELU
MAX POOLING 2× 2 -
DROPOUT RATE = 0.25
DENSE 128 RELU
DROPOUT - RATE = 0.5
DENSE 10 SOFTMAX
2 Related work
The art form of stealing machine learning models has received a lot of attention in the recent years.
In [11], the authors specifically targeted real-world ML-as-a-service [9] platforms such as BigML
and Amazon Machine Learning and demonstrated effective attacks that resulted in extraction of
machine learning models with near-perfect fidelity for several popular model classes. In [3], the
authors trained what they termed as a copycat network using Non-Problem Domain images and stolen
labels to achieve impressive results in the three problems of facial expression, object, and crosswalk
classification. This was followed by work on Knockoff Nets [8], where the authors demonstrated
that by merely querying with random images sourced from an entirely different distribution than
that of the black box target training data, one could not just train a well-performing knockoff but it
was possible to achieve high accuracy even when the knockoff was constructed using a completely
different architecture.
This work differs from the above works in that the attacker is adamant on only using noise images as
querying inputs. Intriguingly enough, the state-of-the-art CNNs are not robust enough to provide a
flat (uniform) softmax output (with weight 1/number-of-classes) when we input non-input-domain
noise at the input layer. This has been studied under two contexts. The first context was within the
framework of fooling images. In [7], the authors showcased how to generate synthetic images that
were noise-like and completely unrecognizable to the human-eye but ones that state-of-the-art CNNs
classified as one of the training classes with 99.99% confidence. The second text was with regards to
what the authors in [4] stated to be rubbish-class examples . Here, they showcased that the high levels
of confident mis-predictions exuded by state-of-the-art trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets in
response to isotropic Gaussian noise inputs.
In this work, we focus on using Bernoulli noise-samples as inputs and using the softmax responses of
the target model to siphon away the weights.
3 Methodology
3.1 Threat model
We propose a framework for model extraction without possession of samples from the true dataset
which the model has been trained on or the purpose of the model other than the dimensionality of the
input tensors as well as the ability to access the resulting class distribution from what is assumed to
be a softmax activation given an input. We make the additional assumption that the architecture of
the model to be extracted is known by the adversary. In our experiments, we assume that the input
tensor is of dimension 28 by 28 and each pixel has values on the interval [0, 1].
3.2 Victim model
The black box model which we attempt to extract, F (·), whose architecture is described in Table 1,
is trained to convergence on a standard dataset for 12 epochs using the Adadelta optimizer with an
initial learning rate of 1.0 and a minibatch size of 128 [1]. From this point onward, this model is
assumed to be a black box in which we have no access to the parameters of each layer.
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3.3 Random stimulus response for model extraction
We procedurally generate a dataset of ‘stimuli’ comprised of 600000 28 by 28 binary tensors
where each pixel is sampled from a Bernoulli distribution with a success probability parameter
p. In other words, let each image xirand ∈ Xrand ⊆ {0, 1}28×28 where xirand,j,k ∼ Bern(p) for
i ∈ {1, ..., 600000}. We sample these tensors with probability parameters p ∈ {0.01, 0.11, ...0.91},
where each p is used to generate 10% of the data. We obtain predictions from the black box model
for each randomly sampled example, yirand = F (x
i
rand), which we refer to as ‘responses.’
3.4 Extraction
We train a new model, Fextract(·), on the stimulus response pairs, {(xirand, yirand)}600000i=1 pairs with
no regularization and evaluate on the dataset originally used to train F (·). The architecture for this
model is the same as F (·), except we remove the dropout layers to encourage overfitting. We train
for 50 epochs using the Adadelta optimizer with an initial learning rate of 1.0 and a minibatch size of
128. Additionally, we acknowledge a significant class imbalance in the highest probability classes in
the softmax vectors yrand, so we remedy this by computing class weights according to the argmax of
each softmax vector, and applying this re-weighting during the training of Fextract(·). We show the
full extraction algorithm in Algorithm 1 and summarize it in Figure 1.
We evaluate our proposed framework on four datasets from the MNIST family of datasets with
identical dimensions: MNIST, KMNIST, Fashion MNIST, and notMNIST [6, 2, 12, 5].
3.5 Experiments with noise distributions
We evaluated the effect of sampling random data xirand from different distributions on the performance
of Fextract(·) on the MNIST validation set. We used the same training procedure as found in the
previously described experiments with two exceptions: we sample only 60000 procedurally generated
examples and we train Fextract(·) for only 10 epochs. We evaluated the use of the uniform distribution
on the bounded interval [0, 1], the standard normal distribution, the standard Gumbel distribution, the
Bernoulli distribution with success parameter p = 0.5, and samples from an Ising model simulation
with inverse temperature parameter β ∈ [0.0, 0.1, ..., 0.9] and resulting values scaled to {0, 1}.
3.6 The Ising prior as a model of spatial correlation
The Ising prior is defined by the density [10]:
p (x) =
exp
[
−β ∑
ij∈E
(xixj)
]
∑
x
exp
[
−β ∑
ij∈E
(xixj)
] ;xi ∈ {−1, 1}
Examples of images sampled from the Ising model can be found in Figure 4.
For this experiment, we evaluated the role of the inverse temperature parameter, β, of the Ising
sampler in training Fextract(·). We first partition the stimulus response pairs, (XIsing, YIsing) into 10
subsets with 7000 examples each corresponding to the different β parameters used to generate the
samples, where (XIsing, YIsing) =
⋃
β∈{0.0,0.1,...,0.9}{(XIsing,β , YIsing,β)}. We train Fextract(·) for 10
epochs for each β and validate on the original dataset. We performed this experiment for MNIST,
KMNIST, Fashion MNIST, and notMNIST and report the variation in performance over different
values of β.
4 Results
4.1 MNIST
We evaluate the efficacy of our framework by training F (·) on MNIST and going on to evaluate
the performance of Fextract(·) on MNIST after extraction. We found that F (·) achieved a validation
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Figure 1: Overview of the model extraction algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Stimulus response model extraction.
Input: data Xtrain, Ytrain, Xval, Yval
Initialize F (·).
Initialize numRandomExamples = 600000.
Initialize dim = 28.
Fit F (Xtrain), Ytrain.
Evaluate F (Xval), Yval.
for p in {0.01, 0.11, ..., 0.91} do
for q in {0, 1, ..., numRandomExamples/10} do
for j in {0, 1, ..., dim-1} do
for k in {0, 1, ..., dim-1} do
xsample,j,k ∼ Bern(p)
end for
end for
Xrand = Xrand ∪ {xsample}
end for
end for
Initialize Fextract(·).
for i ∈ {1, ..., |Xrand|} do
yirand = Fextract(x
i
rand)
end for
Compute class weights CWY rand given Yrand
Fit Fextract(Xrand), Yrand with CWY rand.
Evaluate Fextract(Xval), Yval.
accuracy of 99.03% and Fextract(·) achieved a validation accuracy of 95.93%. The distribution of the
argmax of Yrand can be found in Figure 2. The most underrepresented class according to the argmax
of Yrand was class 6 represented by 198 out of 600000 random examples.
4.2 KMNIST
Our experiments with KMNIST resulted in F (·) achieving a validation accuracy of 94.79% and
Fextract(·) achieving a validation accuracy of 81.18%. Class 8 was found to be the class with the
fewest representatives according to the argmax of Yrand, which had 272 representative examples out
of 600000.
4.3 Fashion MNIST
On the Fashion MNIST dataset, we found that F (·) achieved a validation accuracy of 92.16%, while
Fextract(·) achieved a validation accuracy of 75.31%. For Fashion MNIST, the most underrepresented
class according to the argmax of Yrand was class 7 (sneaker) with only 12 out of 600000 random
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Table 2: Performance using different noise distributions.
DISTRIBUTION Fextract(·)
VALIDATION ACCURACY
UNIFORM (a = 0, b = 1) 11.72%
STANDARD NORMAL
(µ = 0, σ = 1) 68.79%
STANDARD GUMBEL
(µ = 0, β = 1) 70.03%
BERNOULLI (p = 0.5) 76.58%
ISING (β ∈ {0.0, 0.1, ..., 0.9}) 98.02%
examples. Notably, the most common mispredictions according to Figure 3 were incorrectly predict-
ing class 5 (sandal) when the ground truth is class 7 (sneaker) and predicting class 5 (sandal) when
the ground truth is class 9 (ankle boot). Fextract(·) seems to predict the majority of examples from
shoe-like classes to be of class 5 (sandal).
4.4 notMNIST
We found that the notMNIST dataset had a more uniform class distribution according to the argmax
of Yrand than the other datasets that we evaluated. The class with the fewest representatives in this
sense was class 9 (the letter j) with 3950 out of 600000 examples. Despite this potential advantage,
the extracted model Fextract(·) failed to generalize to the notMNIST validation set, achieving an
accuracy of 10.47%, and as can be seen in Figure 3, Fextract(·) predicts class 5 (the letter e) in the vast
majority of cases. In contrast, F (·) achieved a validation accuracy of 88.62%.
4.5 The performance of different noise distributions
In evaluating the effect of sampling from different distributions to construct Xrand, we found that
among the uniform, standard normal, standard Gumbel, Bernoulli distributions, and the Ising model,
samples from the Ising model attained the highest accuracy at 98.02% when evaluating Fextract(·) on
the MNIST validation set. The results for each of the other distributions can be found in Table 2. We
postulate that this is due to the modelling of spatial correlations, which is a property which is lacking
when sampling from the uniform, standard normal, standard Gumbel, and Bernoulli distributions, as
the pixels are assumed to be i.i.d.
4.6 Extraction hardness resulting from data
We propose a measure of model extraction hardness resulting from the dataset which the original
model is trained on as the ratio of the post-extraction validation accuracy (using Fextract(·)) and the
pre-extraction validation accuracy (using F (·)) under our framework. We show that the resulting
ratios are align with the mainstream intuition regarding the general relative learnability of MNIST,
KMNIST, Fashion MNIST, and notMNIST. For MNIST, we found this ratio to be 0.9687, the ratio
for KMNIST was 0.8564, for Fashion MNIST we found it to be 0.8171, and notMNIST achieved a
ratio of 0.1181.
4.7 The role of modelling spatial correlation
We found that the loss and accuracy demonstrate an Occam’s hill effect when the value of β is
varied, which, as Figure 6 demonstrates, is particularly clear in the cases of MNIST and KMNIST. In
Figure 5, we see that across datasets, the losses tend to be minimized around β = 0.3, however the
behavior of larger values of β varies from dataset to dataset. We postulate that this is indicative of the
different distributions of the amount of spatial correlation across each dataset. We also found that
accuracy is maximized at β = 0.3 for MNIST, KMNIST, and Fashion MNIST. We found that the
optimal setting for β for notMNIST was β = 0.8, where the behavior here varies as β increases from
the optimal value.
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Table 3: Performance on original dataset before and after extraction (measured on the validation set).
DATASET PRE-EXTRACTION POST-EXTRACTION
ACCURACY ACCURACY
MNIST 99.03% 95.93%
KMNIST 94.79% 81.18%
FASHION
MNIST 92.16% 75.31%
NOTMNIST 88.62% 10.47%
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we demonstrated a framework for extracting model parameters by training a new model
on random impulse response pairs gleaned from the softmax output of the victim neural network. We
went on to demonstrate the variation in model extractability based on the dataset which the original
model was trained on. Finally, we proposed our framework as a method for which relative dataset
complexity can be measured.
5.1 Future work
This is a work in progress and we are currently working along the following three directions: In
our experiments, pixels are notably i.i.d., whereas in real world settings, image data is comprised of
pixels which are spatially correlated. In this vein, we intend to establish the relationship between the
temperature of an Ising prior and the accuracy obtained by the stolen model. We will experiment
with different architectures, specifically exploring the architecture unknown scenario where the
attacker has a fixed plug-and-play swiss-army-knife architecture whose weights are learned by the
noise and true-model softmax outputs. Additionally, we will explore methods for constructing Xrand
which gives more uniform distributions over argmax(Yrand) and evaluate the associated effect on the
performance of Fextract(·).
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A Additional figures
Figure 2: Distribution of classes given Xrand. From top to bottom: MNIST, KMNIST, Fashion
MNIST, notMNIST.
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Figure 3: Confusion matrices of Fextract(·) on Xval. From top to bottom: MNIST, KMNIST, Fashion
MNIST, notMNIST.
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β = 0.0
β = 0.1
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β = 0.3
β = 0.4
β = 0.5
β = 0.6
β = 0.7
β = 0.8
β = 0.9
Figure 4: Examples of images from an Ising model simulation at various β parameters.
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Figure 5: Occam’s hill effect for loss when β is varied. From top to bottom: MNIST, KMNIST,
Fashion MNIST, notMNIST.
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Figure 6: Occam’s hill effect for accuracy when β is varied. From top to bottom: MNIST, KMNIST,
Fashion MNIST, notMNIST.
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